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This essay presents the results of a study which
surveyed the various aspects of system security hardware,
software, and procedural techniques in use in current and
proposed automated systems. Its impetus is from the ccncern
for security control that has been generated by the
increasing number of time-sharing and resource-sharing
systems. The intention is to present the designers,
managers, programmers, system implementers, and operational
personnel with a consolidated source of data concerning
security techniques and with a tool to evaluate the data and
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The basic security requirement in any system is to
prevent unauthorized access or change of data while allowing
authorized use necessary to accomplish the system's mission.
Manual systems require the protection of data only.
Automated systems introduce the added problem of protecting
the process, both programs and hardware, that are used to
store, access and change the data. This implies the
necessity of adequate safeguards built into management, and
hardware/software aspects of the system. Thus a decision
must be made as to w h at is_ needed in the way of security.
The processing and storing of sensitive information and
preventing it from falling into the wrong hands is a
technological problem requiring a comprehensive examination
of both the type of information and the possible/prcbable
threats that a data bank will be required to handle.
The objective of the current effort is to (1) review
current and completed studies of the security and access
limitation problem for automated systems; (2) analyze the
data collected considering the differences in techniques as
required by systems and users; (3) discuss techniques for
data base security and access control applicable to a qiven
system.

II- Mill RE OF THE PROBLEM
A close examination of security requirements indicates
that they are dependent on the specific type of threat posed
to the system. There are three general classes of threats:
unintentional, deliberate passive, and deliberate active.
Unintentional threats are those that arise from hardware
and software failures and user errors which allow
unauthorized but inadvertant access to files or programs.
Deliberate passive threats are caused by electromagnetic
radiation from the computer hardware and communications
eguipment. Passive methods include wire-tapping and
monitoring of electromagnetic emanations.
Deliberate active threats are from attempts to enter the
system so as to obtain data from the files or to interfere
with data files or the system. Examples of this type of
threat are (1) using legitimate access to ask or obtain
unauthorized access (browsing), (2) masguerading as a
legitimate user, (3) using access to the system as support
personnel (systems programmers, operator, hardware
maintenance, management) to obtain data or create trap doors
into the system, (4) tapping into remote terminals to
receive "piggy back" entry with an authorized user, (5)
between lines entry, and (6) cancellation of user's sign off
signals to continue operation.
These threats are nearly the same for all systems,
differing primarily in the degree which system design
features allow exploitation. This potential for
exploitation is created at each point where a user interacts
with the system. Since the security requirements depend on
the threat of exploitation and the threat of exploitation in
turn depends on the particular system access point, the key
to specifying the security requirements for a system lies in
an examination of the systems accessibility.

III. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS COMMON TO ALL SYSTEMS
The overall safeguarding of information in a computer
system, regardless of configuration, is achieved by a
com fci nation cf protection features aimed at the different
areas of leakage points. These areas are discussed and an
overview of the vulnerability points are depicted in fig 1.
A. MAINTENANCE AND SUPPORT ACCESS
All systems have the requirement to allow access for
maintenance of the system software and hardware. This
"support access" must be provided for the system
programmers, maintenance personnel, computer operators, and
management personnel responsible for the system operation.
It represents a potential means of deliberate active
penetration and has been addressed in the literature on
non-military systems as the area of most ccncern.
Non-military systems lack the procedural security
regulations established by law for military systems. [AMR
71]
The support access characteristics were similar in all
systems. Access at the assembly/procedure oriented language
level is needed- to debug programs, maintain hardware, and
establish system operating conditions. In all government
systems, this support activity was conducted only at local
terminals within the secure computer area, where common
procedural techniques were relied on to limit access to
cleared personnel.
The accessibility afforded to support personnel in
commercial systems has received more attention in terms of
the development of sophisticated automated security
techniques. The primary reason is that military systems
have developed strong procedural techniques (clearance









4-1 •H 4-> o
4-1 >s 3 u













<1) 4-1 JQ CU
>-l •H •H M
3 3 ^ 3
.-H O 4-1 H
•H 5-1 C •H
cfl •H o CO




4J 4-1 CO CO
CO CO s c
u u 4J o
•H •H '4-1 •H
U-4 4-1 o 1-1
H C CO CO
4J <u CJ
C .c CD •H
CD 4J tH 4-1
•V 3 4J •r-!




























legal penalties for infractions) that are not available for
use in commercial systems.
Security requirements determined by the need for support
access include (1) the ability to isolate access to programs
and data to only those authorized to maintain the particular
program/file, (2) the ability to effectively restrict
maintenance personnel to the maintenance of specific
software routines, (3) the need for procedures to insure
that programs are completely debugged, (4) the need to audit
files for unauthorized changes, (5) the ability to determine
if equipment is operating properly before it is placed in
the system, (6) the ability to detect and control changes to
systems routines, (7) the ability to bound dumps of memory
and peripheral storage, (8) the ability to determine that a
program only performs the function for which it was
designed, and (9) the ability to restrict access by internal
control tables.
B. FAILURE ACCESS
The threat of compromise from the release of data or
programs due to hardware or software failure is common to
all systems and represents a potential means of
unintentional penetration. Such failures can involve the
coupling of information from one user with that of another
user, rendering the files or programs unusable. They could
result in defeat or circumvention of security measures, or
unintentional change in security status of users files or
terminals. Accidental disclosures may also occur by
improper actions of machine operating or maintenance
personnel without deliberate intent.
Security requirements determined by the need for failure
control include the following: (1) the ability to trap to
software error routines when parity errors are encountered,
(2) the ability to prevent circumvention by software "bugs"
of the partitioning technique that isolates data and
10

programs from unauthorized access, (3) the need to check out
and certify program changes and equipment repairs to ensure
that they are operating correctly, (4) the need to maintain
the protection mechanism when a system error is encountered,
(5) the need to recover from failure without revealing
protected data and system tables, (6) the need to protect
back-up files, and to certify that the appropriate Lackup
file is loaded.
C. DELIBERATE PASSIVE ACCESS
Electromagnetic radiation, wiretapping, and "bugs" can
be used on all systems if proper security techniques are not
implemented. Electromagnetic radiations from computer
equipment pcwer lines and communications lines can be
detected and decoded. Wiretapping into communications lines
can be used to send and receive data. The planting of bugs
or recording devices is possible if proper area security
precautions are not used. Techniques that are applicable to
this category of requirements are cryptographic data
transformations and/or shielded lines for communication
links, and maintenance of a properly secured area.
Security requirements determined by the need to prevent
deliberate passive access include conventional red/black
(classified lines & unclassified lines) isolation
requirements as well as (1) the ability to encode/decode
transmitted data so that it cannot be deciphered. (2) the
need to certify that hardware either can not be, or has not
been tampered with and, (3) the ability to make stored data

















Jz; o o ^W P -P
0) <D a>
" §
pq « to to O
Pi cd 3 •P









M £3 W CQ
« CO CO
r> -P o oO p! o o
w cd o o
CO
CD











Js CO CO CQ CQ
o >h CQ CQ dM CO o Q P<
CO o o
Whl o O CD
fi>^ co" rt -p
< rt
fe -p o uoo Pt U O CQ !
EH o 3 JQ CQ !
CO P<rH
-H <D
WJ3 PVH H O
CO o —< CS CD o
CO s CO Ct rf
<£










<X oW CO G«H
t«1 O-P
ffl •H rt
a o -P o
o < rf -HM W O <M
CO O -H
w o H COQB CQ CO
CQ <DHl<
P^ « CD to as HO ^ O <3 c o
.-3 o 3 •H
CO ^3 ctf tO fi ctfK o C| PiP
CO M Ph C3 cd n5
CO H a h-3 En Q
< PC CO

















































IV. SECURITX REQUIREMENTS PARTICULAR TO A GIVEN SYSTEM
Systems differ in their interface with the system user.
The user of the system exercises the system for its
functional purpose and is not concerned with its design,
implementation, or maintenance. User accessibility to a
system is defined by the type of system interface, the
language capability offered, and the clearance of data and
users provided. Different combinations of these imply
increasingly sophisticated levels of access rights and hence
different possibilities of penetration attempts. User
access capability that directly relate to security
requirements are language capability, terminal location and
usage and, user and data clearance levels.
A. USER LANGUAGE CAPABILITY
The user interfaces with the automated system in either
an off-line or an on-line mode. In an off-line mode he
submits reguests for data services to support personnel and
receives as his output printed reports. This mode of
operation is typical of closed shop batch systems. Their
security reguirements, in so far as they concern the user,
differ from manual systems only by the addition of a
requirement for security within the secure area cf the
computer facility.
In the on-line mode, the user is provided a capability
to reguest data services directly from the computer
eguipment by means of some input (generally remote) device.
His form of interaction with the computer can vary from
rigid requests for predetermined fixed transaction
input/output, to use of a free-form query language, and
entry of actual computer programs in procedure oriented or
assembly language. Increased security requirements are




Fixed transaction input/output allows the system
designer to predetermine what will be the specific input and
output allowed for a given user at a given terminal. The
ability to enter and execute POL or assembly language
programs places the user at almost the same capability as
support personnel and could allow circumvention of security
technigues implemented for fixed format or free form guery
capabilities. A higher level of security reguirements is
necessary to provide protection against this increased
language capability. See figure 2.
B. TERMINAL LOCATION AND USAGE
The ability of a user to access or change data from
remote terminals suggests penetration methods not possible
in a system with only local terminals within a secure area.
The communications lines must be protected and systems or
user errors could allow release of data outside the secure
area. Additionally, the vulnerability of a remote terminal
secure area, especially in a tactical military system, is
greater.
System security reguirements are also influenced by the
use of the terminals; that is, whether there is only one
class of need-to-know at a given terminal or whether there
are multiple classes of need-to-know at a given terminal.
Multiple need-to-know at a given terminal reguires that the
system be able to identify the different user classes at a




The security classification of data is an expression of
the value of the information to national defense and hence

























































































































Systems which handle Top Secret data have a higher security
requirement than those which handle data of lower
classification. In a security requirement sense, if
different levels of data classification exists, the security
design problem increases since techniques must be
implemented to isolate the different levels, provide the
proper deqree of security protection, and guard against
unintentional or deliberate attempts to gain access to data
at unauthorized security levels.
Three levels of security requirements exist dependinq
upon the classification of data in the system and the level
of clearance of the user: (1) the data classification is
all one level (such as Secret) and all users are cleared to
that level. (2) different data classification exists (Top
Secret, Secret, Confidential) with users of different
clearance levels, and (3) unclassified data exists with
classified data and uncleared users are allowed to access
the unclassified data. The security requirement increases




V. COMPARISON BETWEEN HARDWARE^ SOFTWARE^ and PROCEDURAL
TECHNIQUES
The comparison of hardware and software techniques
identifies which security function can best be accomplished
by each and whether combinations of these techniques are
necessary to provide adequate protection. A comparison of
manual versus automated systems procedures identifies the
similarities between the two systems and the different
approaches taken to perform the security function. Such a
comparison provides a method to judqe the relative value of
automated techniques to achieve at least the same security
level as manual systems. This section considers first the
comparison of hardware and software techniques which can be
used for security purposes and then considers the
similarities and differences between automated and manual
system security procedures.
Fiqures 4 and 5 provide a qualitative assessment of the
relative merits and costs of the techniques discussed.
These costs are divided into three areas. Costs for
procedural techniques were not estimated.
Response time - the cost incurred by every message input
to the system expressed as an effect on the length of time
that a message . response is delayed by the processing
required for the technique in question.
Throuqhput - the cost incurred by the system expressed
as the decrease in the amount of processing the system is
able to accomplish in a given time period caused by the
additional processing required for the technique in
question.
Procurement - the cost associated with each technique
expressed as the degree of expense involved in developing,
maintaining, and servicing the technique in question.
The effect in each case is described as low, medium, or
high, where low is taken to mean less than 5 percent
17

increment in the cost of the system, medium to mean between
5 and 10 percent, and high to mean more than 10 percent.
A. SOFTWARE TECHNIQUES
The software techniques surveyed are described and
compared in terms of the general threat to which they apply.
The techniques are categorized by the major functional
routines of an on-line system.
1 • User Interface
The user interface is the point at which the user
becomes known to and interacts with the system. In a
secure system, only known users can be permitted access.
The proper identification of the user is necessary for
accountability and, in a system that allows multiple
need-to-know access at a terminal, to determine the access
rights tc be associated with the task that is initiated by a
users input request.
a. User Security Clearance
The user security clearance is the assignment to
each user of a code word indicating the highest
classification level of data to which he has been authorized
access. Generally, the code word consists of three bits,
allowing for seven combinations, that are compared on a
simple eguality test against the security classification
code of the data. The assignment and maintenance cf codes
are the responsibility of either the security officer, the
data administrator, or support personnel. The legal pairs
of user codes and data classif iciation codes are maintained
in most cases in a system table which can only be accesed in
executive mode.
b. User Access Privileges
If it is necessary to link individual users to
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of user profile must be developed either pointing to or
specifically identifying the user access privileges. This
profile may contain the identity or classification of the
files available to the user, the manner in which the files
can be accessed (i.e., read, write, process, modify or
erase) the degree to which access is permitted, the specific
terminals from which the user may operate, and the
particular processes he may execute (named routines,
standard jobs, or precompiled transactions). [Glasser 67]
The user profiles themselves are maintained as a system
file, normally resident on secondary storage because cf its
size. Because of its sensitivity, the data contents of the
file are usually transformed.
c. Password
The password is the privileged identifier that a
user must submit to obtain entry to the system. From a
software standpoint, it is the only means of initially
identifying a legal system user. Passwords may be required
at log-in, at both log-in and log-out, or for every
transaction executed. The more frequently the password is
required, the less likely is the possibility that an illegal
user will obtain entry but the more costly the user
interface becomes in terms of its effect on the thruput and
response time. Typed-in passwords range from 3 to 18
alphanumeric characters in existing systems, are either
fixed or variable in length and may contain blanks. No data
was available on the format of voiceprint or key-pattern
passwords. Passwords remain unchanged in some systems, are
changed periodically in others, and are changed at irregular
intervals in one proposed design. [Weissman 69] The more
freguently the password is changed, the higher are both the
maintenance cost and the error rate. Passwords are either
assigned, generated, or selected using some standard random
number generator.
Although it has been shown that any password
scheme can eventually be broken, the degree of difficulty of
24

doing so exceeds that of opening a 3-way 50-number
safe-combination when the password exceeds five alphanumeric
characters. Some systems attempt to detect password
tinkering by assuming that a fixed number of consecutive
illegal attempts (usually 2) from the same terminal is
sufficient cause. Legal passwords are maintained in every
case as a system table.
d. Password Dialogue
Since it is possible to eventually break any
password scheme, several variations of the technigues have
been suggested to obtain more foolproof identificaticn of
legal users. One such variant is to reguire the user to
engage in a form of dialogue with the system after the
initial password is validated. This dialogue requires the
user to provide responses either unique to himself (his
payroll number in one case; another password in another
case; a user defined item of personal knowledge in a third
case) or to perform some relatively simple algorithm on
either a system-supplied random variable or some transitory
guantity (time of day, date, etc) ; the system performs the
same algorithm and checks the validity of the response.
[ Babcock 67] (e.g., system : "enter password", user: shazam,
system:"OK. enter key", user: 3750094) Once again, the
scheme is susceptible to penetration, but the level of
difficulty has been raised significantly - at a cost in
increased terminal response time and communication line
loading. [ Baran 64]
e. Consecutive Password List
Another variation of the basic password
technigue is to assign a list of legal passwords to each
user. The system will accept only the next password on the
list each time that the user enters his password. This
makes it extremely difficlt to obtain a legal password
through either passive deliberate penetration attempts or
active tinkering with password combinations, but it also
requires hard copy lists of legal passwords to be made
25

available to users and inevitably produces a greater number
of erroneous entries by legal users. In spite of these
drawbacks, consecutive passwords for each input has been
accepted as an alternative to encrypted data links in one
military system. [ Weissman 69]
f. Password Transform
Since the list of legal passwords is considered
to be extremely sensitive information, it is usually
resident in core, and is frequently appended to program
status blocks. Several systems have taken steps to prevent
its being obtained either deliberately or accidentally by a
readout from core. These steps involve implementing various
transformation techniques on passwords received. Huffman
encoding is used in one system; a simple transposition of
digits is used in another; an algorithm to produce
non-reversible inversions is implemented in a third.
[ Petersen 67 ]
2 • Terminal S ubsystem
Nearly all of the systems surveyed provided for
on-line terminals and a significant part of the software in
these systems is that associated with terminal
characteristics. Less significant, however, are the
software techniques implemented to account for security
requirements arising from remote terminals. Terminals must
be discretely identified to insure that data is transmitted
to the correct location. Terminals at remote sites are
susceptible to com irunication errors on transmission due to
noise, may be easily expropriated for illegal use, and are
subject frequently to public or semi-private display and the
subsequent casual eavesdropping.
a. Error Correction Methods
The most obvious problem with terminals
connected to a system through communication lines is the
noise factor on the communication lines themselves. It
26

introduces the possibility that illegal values or erroneous
addresses may be input in otherwise valid messages. Methods
have been developed in many systems to reduce the effects of
noise in transmission. They include hash totals (i.e.,
cumulative adds) of characters or bits in the message;
parity check bits and longitudinal redundancy checks to
detect garbled words; and retransmission to compare
duplicate results.
b. Terminal Answerback
Since it is possible to piggyback illegal
terminals onto legal circuits, particularly in dialed and
switched network systems, methods have been developed to
uniguely identify legal terminals. Often, the identity is
established by comparing the expected terminal address to a
hard-wired terminal identifier that automatically transmits
(i.e., "answers back") an identification- key (20
alphanumeric characters in the system where this figure was
published) with each input message or in response to a
reguest code preceeding each output message. [CDC 66]
c. Terminal Profile
The classes of data and/or users that can be
legally associated with a given terminal are defined in a
terminal profile list. This list is an extension of the
terminal address table maintained by the executive. It
usually only describes the highest security classification
of data that can be output to a given terminal. It may also
include a list of specific transactions that can be executed
from that terminal and/or a list of explicitly named users
who may access through the terminal. [Heissman 67]
d. Terminal Character Suppression
Any on-line terminal that is used to input
identification codes is susceptible to both casual and
deliberate eavesdropping. There are two variations of a
technigue to reduce the vulnerability of input codes. In
the case where hard-copy is used, the system strikes over
the number of positions reguired for identifier codes each
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time such a code is expected from the user. This provides a
marginal degree of protection. In the other case, a code is
transmitted to the terminal to suspend printing or
display-images on the text-line in which an identifier code
is expected by the system.
e. Automatic Alarm and Disconnect
If the system is able to detect that a terminal
or a terminal connection is being used for (attempted)
illegal input, it is necessary to provide an alarm to alert
the control group and to isolate the suspect terminal from
the system. Obviously, the alert should include the
terminal address. It could also include the nature of the
attempted input. Since it may be advantageous not to alert
the interloper that his prescence has been detected, the
isolation of the suspect terminal in one suggested plan
would still permit it to remain linked to the system by
engaging the user in a series of guestions and delays. In
most cases, however, the terminal is disconnected and/or the
keyboard is locked to prevent further communication.
Bringing the terminal on-line again usually reguires that
the security officer or control group input a special
identifier code.
3 • E xec utive/ Mon itor
The heart of any multi-programming system is the
executive control routine. It is the most complex,
sophisticated, and important component of the software. By
its very nature, it is perhaps the most difficult to
penetrate but then, it is undoubtedly the most rewarding.
In this area in particular, procedural technigues must be
relied upon. It is impossible to prevent support personnel
from leaving "trapdoors" or potential entry points in the
software and the need for integrity of and confidence in
support personnel is paramount. Many of the technigues





Given that the hardware has a master/user mode
capability, the set of instructions that can be executed in
the master mode are regarded as privilegded instructions.
Since they are intimately involved with system
control
,
(e. g. , the setting and resetting of bounds
registers, the initiation of channel commands, the loading
of read/write address registers, the deciphering of internal
and external interrupts) they have an immediate application
to security requirements. They should be used sparingly and
should be concentrated in a few easily associated routines.
The routines should operate in priviledged mode as briefly
as possible, branching to user mode to perform the function
initiated. Dispersing priviledged instructions in many
executive routines simply improves the chances for trapdoors
and illegal circumvention.
b. Relocatable Bootstrap
If it were possible to bypass protection keys
and to gain access to areas of memory normally reserved for
the executive and its tables, then it would also be possible
to read any of the access lists and authority tables
controlled by the executive. One technique suggested to
reduce the likelihood of this occurring is tc perform
bootstrap loading, of executive routines from a changing key
address. In this manner, executive routines and tables no
longer have absolute locations relative to each other and to
the user partitions, and only haphazard location of the
secured routines would be possible. Because of its
potential effect on the efficiency of the system, the
technique has only been discussed. [CDC 66]
c. Redundant Coding
Since it is possible to modify code prior to
loading, it has been suggested that key routines exist as
multiple, discrete copies, and that requests for the
services of these routines be executed in parallel by each
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copy. The results can then be compared, including number of
instructions executed. The effective cost of this approach
is high even in a multiprocessing system, but it further
insures that key security routines cannot be modified or
executed without detection. [Molho 70]
d. Module Dialogue
In any calling sequence, the parameters passed
between modules are usually specified as a part of the
standard call macro. It has been suggested that this be
modified some-what in those cases where it is feared that an
interloper may substitute his own code for a system routine.
At random points in the routine in question, private call
parameters known only to the programmer responsible for that
routine can be inserted. The routine called (or calling) is
also prepared to expect the interpersed dialogue words.
Since these would be difficult to detect in absolute code,
it would raise considerably the level of difficulty
associated with making such code substitutions.
e. Program Interpretation
Since it is difficult to detect subtle changes
in absolute code, it has been suggested that programs be
loaded through an interpreter at all times. If the
interpreter includes some kind of code optimizer, each
version cf a program in its absolute code form would be
slightly different than the preceding one. In this way, not
only would it be difficult for a penetrator to modify or
decipher program routines (except as a one-time event) , but
it would also be difficult for the programmer himself to
take advantage of fixed relationships in his program that
might permit the introduction of trap-doors.
f. Centralized I/O Control
This is a fairly common technique employed by
most third-generation systems. It separates application
programs from direct address references to I/O devices and
instead requires them to submit macro commands that deal
with the device as a logical, virtual, or relative extension
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of memory. The executive then generates and performs the
physical I/O commands and thereby is able to iraintain
control over boundary establishment and limited units of
allocation. Without the equivalent hardware capability to
trap to monitor mode whenever privileged instructions are
attempted, this approach cannot be validated,
g. Error Monitors
In a system with many users, the cost of
maintaining security can increase significantly if the user
error-rate is high. This technique is intended to maintain
a rating of the capability of individual users to perform
the procedures associated with inputting valid transactions.
If their errcr-rate increases beyond a predetermined level,
then their priority in the system is decreased. The ccst of
maintaining this scheme is quite high however, since it
requires some corresponding method to re-evaluate and to
certify the user's capability,
h. Error Interrupts
Any attempt to perform an illegal operation, to
address some location outside of assigned boundaries, to
input erroneous data, etc. , should be the cause of an error
interrupt. The routines to handle such interrupts can
attempt to correct the error and resubmit the request, abort
or suspend the user in question, alarm control authorities,
or regard the error as acceptable, flag it, and continue
processing. Once it is determined in monitor mode what the
interrupt is, any further processing to deal with it should
be performed in user mode to reduce the occasions for
illegal execution of privileged instructions.
i. Executive Commands By Access Rights
This technique associates a category code with
all executive command routines and restricts their direct
use to only the subset of users cleared to the eguivalent
category of access.
j. Eoundary Haps
Boundary maps are the legal units of allocation
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assigned to given users. They represent the direct input to
base and limit registers that determine the domain in which
a user can be active. Boundary maps in most cases are
stored with the user in question and represent a potential
means to illegally extend the accessibility afforded a given
function should they be modified. [CDC 66 ]
k. Memory Access Keys
In a page or segment-oriented system, there are
usually lock registers associated with each physical page in
memory. When a user is assigned to memory, his identifier
is used to generate a unique key that is loaded into all of
the page registers assigned to the particular user. An
address reference to the protected pages cannot be made
unless it contains the appropriate key-pattern in its own
key register. Obviously, selected executive routines must
have a universal key. Setting and access to the key
registers should be a privileged function. [IBM 67]
1. Security Monitor
The security monitor is a technique that
attempts to certify the validity of the various protection
mechanisms in a system. At its simplest, it consists of a
set of on-line diagnostic routines that exercise the various
hardware components in a configuration, expecting a valid
operation tc produce a pre-designa ted result. In a more
complex form, it attempts to deliberately execute illegal
hardware or software operations and then determines whether
or not the responsible protection mechanism has successfully
intercepted and handled the illegal attempt; this version
can have a significant effect on system thruput and,
therefore, requires a careful consideration of what are
acceptable and expected failure levels. [ Molho 70]
4
- Ziie Handler
The data available in any system is the reward for
penetrating the system. The data available in an automated
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system significantly increases the potential reward because
of the large amount, the anonymity of access, and the
difficulty of detection. Data protection is traditionally
obtained by assigning responsibility and limiting access.
Techniques to accomplish both are available in automated
systems. At least the same level of protection can be
obtained in an automated system as in a manual system.
a. File Classification Code
This technique is commonly employed in most
systems that deal with formally classified data. It simply
involves assigning one of the categories of classification
to each data file and then either assigning the file only to
jobs or individuals of equal or higher clearance, or, in the
case of shared files, releasing data from the file only to
users of equal or higher clearance. A somewhat
adventuresome extension of this technique is to attempt to
automatically assign classification levels to new files. In
one system, this is done by using the highest classification
from contributing files. [ Weissman 69] In a proposed
scheme, it is done by doing a key-word count and weighing
the file in accordance with the number of key-words
encountered. [Daley 65] In neither case was it shown to be
statistically more or less effective than manual
classification, except in the marginal area between
unclassified and confidential.
b. File Access Lists By File
An extension of the file classification cede is
the assignment of specific authority lists to each file.
These lists describe the original creator (or owner) of the
file, other individuals, group, terminal, etc., who can
share the file, usually the manner in which they can access
the file (read, write, modify, execute, or erase) , and the
degree to which access is permitted. At the file level
only, it corresponds to the cataloguing function of most
third-generation systems. [Glasser 67]
c. File Access Lists By Level
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An extension of the previous technique that
permits it to be used in a more flexible environment than
that described by formal discrete files is to assign access
lists to levels of files, or to individual modes in data
sets. This is especially useful if the files consist of
programs arranged in some kind of hierarchy freer common
(free) utility routines to machine-oriented (owned) system
routines. The cost of maintenance, particularly the
determination of access privileges is quite high. [Babcock]
d. File Access Profile
If a number of users with different need-tc-know
interact with a shared set of data, it is necessary to
distinguish the data rights of each user. This is
accomplished by assigning to each file descriptor a profile
word that contains a set of flag-bits, each flag-bit
representing a unique need-to-know identifer. In the
systems utilizing this technique, separate profile words are
assigned for read and update access. There is associated
with each user's profile an equivalent word with the
need-to-know flag assignment according to his requirement
for data. A one-to-one correspondence between user and file
profiles at each flag position is required before access is
permitted. [Bingham 65]
e. Data Element Classification Code
This is identical to "file classification code"
except that each data element in the file is separately
classified. The system can then handle files with mixed
classes of data. This feature greatly reduces the
redundancy associated with file processing since it permits
the grouping of data by functional purpose and utilization
rather than by classification. However, it raises both the
cost of creating files and the cost of assigning
andmaintaining classification categories. [Weissman 69]
f. Data Element Profile
This technique is identical to "file access
profile" except that the system can now discriminate amonq
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need-to-know at a finer level of detail. It is usually
impleraeted by assigning an update word and an access word to
each data element descriptor; these words have particular
bit settings according to their class. Users with matching
need-to-know patterns are permitted access to the data
element. The bit-patterns are combined to form a composite
need-to-know profile for each data reguest. In a few
instances, the data element profiles also contains legal
values of a data element that are accessible by a given
class of users.
g. File Encryption, Single Key
Technigues for encrypting data have been
suggested for use in file handling systems. In most cases,
these are variations of cryptographic technigues applied to
communication transmission, and consist of applying a single
key to all records in the file. However, because of the
large number of records in most data files and because of
the rather consistant pattern of field occurrences, this
type of file encryption only provides a marginal increase in
protection. Depending on the amount of character
manipulation in the crypto technigue, CPU thruput cost can
be guite high. [skatrud 69]
h. File Encryption, Multiple Key
A variation of the proceeding technigue that
reduces the possibility of deciphering is to use a different
key (either a cascading or random number seguence) for each
record or for certain number of records. This breaks the
consistency of the encoded data and does not significantly
affect the cost of encoding/decoding process. [Van Tassel
69]
i. Data Edition Number
In a system where multiple users are
concurrently updating a set of shared data files, it is
necessary to prevent one update seguence from intruding on
another. A suggested tecnhigue is to assign an edition
number to every record in the data base. Each user contains
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the latest version of this edition number in its associated
data buffer. When a retrieved record is to be written back
into the data base, the file handler checks the user's
edition- number against the data base edition number and only
permits the update if the edition numbers are the sane. The
file handler also updates the edition number. [Corbato 65]
j. Block- Write Collision
This technique addresses itself to the same
problem as above, but does not attempt to control the
interaction at the record level. Instead of an edition
number a block-busy flag is assigned to each file segment.
When a segment is retrieved for update, the block-busy flag
is set, as are all antecedent blocks in the structure (or
only the highest level block if the entry point is always
top-down through the same index) . The busy-flag is left on
until the user has indicated completion of the update and
the file-handler has modified the affected index blocks.
[ Babcock 67 ]
k. Ring Structures
Eing structures are a combination of logical
layers, or rings of data grouped by sensitivity, and
identifiers associated with each user that describes the
equivalent sensitivity of the user. It is permissable for a
user to access and/or execute any data or routine in its own
ring. When a call is made to a segment in another ring, the
system traps to a gate controller, which determines if the
called ring is more or less sensitive. If the sensitivity
is less, then the call is linked to the ring in question.
If it is greater, then a check is made of the access list
associated with the requested segment. This list identifies
legal users (or classes or users) , and indicates the type of
access and the particular entry point at which they nay use
the requested segment. The gate controller then establishes
the required linkages. To prevent repetitive calls to the
gate controller, upper and lower bounds can be assigned to
each type of access for any user; requests to any rings
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within those bounds are automatic and equivalent to
operating within the ring of the requesting user. The
system that implemented this technique had special hardware
registers to check the ring-brackets of segment requests.
[ Glasser 67]
5. Others
Various other software techniques were encountered
during the data collection phase that do not conveniently
fit into the preceeding categories. For the most part,
these techniques have to do with using the automated system
to simplify or extend some of the procedural requirements in
a secured system.
a. Document Log
Some systems automatically maintain an
accountability log making an entry each time that a
classified report is related to a user. This log includes
the date and time of the original request, the parameters
specifying the report extraction criteria, and the terminal
and user identification. The security log is available only
to an identified security officer.
b. Erroneous Attempts Limit
This technique is applied - at several
intersection points between a user request and system
function. Since a potential interloper can tinker with
legality checks at any one of these points, it is necessary
to set some limit on the number of consecutive illegal
inputs that will be accepted from any user. Some type of
on-line monitoring is required to record or link the
sequence of requests.
c. Aggregate Techniques For Reports
A serious problem in on-line system is the
possibility that even though a user cleared to a low level
of access can only access data legally classified at or
below his level, the aggregation of all data accessed can
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provide the basis for interpretive conclusions about higher
classified information. Techniques have been suggested that
would combine the access profiles (data element profile) and
all data elements contained in the report into a new profile
that would yield a restricted classification of the report
on a need-to-know basis. However, this cannot prevent
inferences from data, and more work is needed in this area
to determine if some kind of weighting of information
content might be possible. [Feige 69]
d. Overwrite And Memory Erase
Any magnetic recording medium retains an
electromagnetic image of the recorded data for some time
after the initial impression. This residue can be read
directly, albeit inadvertently, if access to the area is
obtained or picked up through passive deliberate penetration
attempts. Since both primary and secondary storage in most
on-line multiuser systems is considered to be virtual
memory, it is entirely possible that an area in which
classified data had been stored and processed could be
reassigned to a user having a lower classification level.
To prevent this, methods have been developed to overwrite
primary memory by cascading or leapfrogging thru the area
and writing a system constant (usually zeros) after the
memory space is deallocated. The confidence in this
technique is increased if it is procedurally established
that every user routine fills its scratch area with a
different constant. In only a few systems is the same
approach used for secondary storage, since the time required
to overwrite deallocated file space on a peripheral device,
particularly one with a single read-write head, can be
considerable. If a centralized data manager is used by all
system users for handling data files, it is conceivable that
reallocated space can safely be maintained as "dirty"





This technique is used in batch oriented systems
where, to the system, a user consists of a set of programs
and their associated data files. Since the programs are
designed to suit this single set of data, they take on the
classification of the data and can only be called or
modified by job control statements input with the proper
classif icaticn leader.
f. Classification Headers and Trailers On Hardcopy
and Displays
This technique is an extension of the current
procedural technique of stamping at the top and bottom of
every classified page of a report the classification level.
It is usually a parameter option in the report generation
routine.
g. File Log
The file log is an extension of the security log
in which every reference to classified data is logged. It
can include the previous data image if the reference causes
a change. It also usually includes the terminal, user,
time, data, and data parameters associated with the
reference.
B. HARDWARE TECHNIQUES
Many of the hardware techniques required for security
purposes have been implemented in third generation
commercial computer systems and in some military computer
systems. The surveyed techniques are assigned to categories
that correspond to the major devices and components in an
on-line system.
1 • Central Processing Unit (CPU)
Security related techniques in the CPU provide
control of the logical processes to access and change data.




































































































































•H *-• tH <U
«*H cs u
>H "C c a
tO QJ •H 5
V. to E •o
r. ri Vh Vh
r-t 4J a; rJ






















































iH rt to c
O *c CO u
U to i-4 to
+J
•D u V-. >. +J
c C OJ -^ • w
o r3 •M >s •w JC
u to +-< u Vh
to •^ • -J •w 3 fc- mC u tr. Vh t£ U rt
s o V C o o •H























E E O U
4-' 3 D U-, •t-i
•t-( •w 3
5 •o •c 4-> D' s
CJ CD •H CJ a












































<U ~£ CD rt rt rt 10 u 10 to so
i 4-> •s. U u *-' to •. co w E
w-» •o u Cj cj rt o ftj >- QJ c » CJ a
o rt K l-l 4-J 3 u o re 3 Wl 3 u B3 c u u
o CD o »-l u +-> +j •c Q c u E c u tj5
Wt u X Ui o u rt u re rt •H E •w rt rt •H rt O
O c 0) 4-" O c c O CJ tr. U i-> u
l-t u c 14 a a Q QJ E o •Q ^ o •o a
u u o c o CD o to o •tH v-i l-i Wi C/ 6" 3 CJ
V V 4-> N c to N E *v. +> O C N Vj Ui N r-4
•tH a 3 •H rt •H rt O •H o •rH c. 4-> •H rt
V CJ (0 U Ih u w u, (.0 •*-" 4-> U w 14 •r-l
u 1-4 +-> O CD CJ c w*. o <L E w> c rt o u rt
a rt c ,d 4-i "O Z-i o JZ 4- r: to c 10 *") 4- "C j; CJ 4J£ 5 E 4-> 3 •H 4-> l-l 4-> tH w V. •H M K 4J rt 4-> a re
•o •a 0) 3 u !fi 3 a. 2 rt t£ V c U CJ ~ "^ re 3 to •a
u w 4-> a o 4-> ci re c u •H C <J re 4-> re













C C tj b£
rt rt •H CJ
•c Ml £».
C to
D Wi J •u
"O <u u,
tU 4-> >. ok to 4-> ^r
•H •i-(
>> to W. >
CJ CJ re CJ
^ &. 0. u
o >-
to 14
>* >> rt o
u |H kl E
o c w 5j
E E S
CJ CD X
;r •c— o C
o >
>- o tH •H
t-i CD c 4->
c 4J re
C a >- •«H
o u u
•o •rt O O
a •a E to
CD CD CJ to


















E r ^ O E
E «W tl -H x-> H 3
3 E 3 *-> •H
s 5 z •H 3: c; c 3j 5 s S: XJ
o o o xj o r: Q-i <u O c o O d





















u5 5 S s 5 S s > 3
o O o o O o o o O




N CJ o •H
•H •H tu >^ U-,
h rt rt <H .\ rt rt V,
O M 4-> +-> •H •H +-> +j CJ
JC u KS rt (0 Ih ca n 3 E
4-> O Xj •c to •c •c XJ CJ
3 «H v< aJ .C •t-l E t-i
A £> VM o *4-< H +-> U-( l*H to
C O t-l O o 3 o o CJ C l-l
3






O c c c o 3 c c o to
+-> E •T"< o •f-t •!-< •t-t 4-> c CJ
CJ *-> t- +-> CJ C r-l +-> 4-> '<-< It
to E 3 rt 3 to O CJ 3 3 to c rt
to o > O ct c o to •H a: 5
CJ C u X) u CJ rt c t-l w CJ a u X)
o •H to v. to t-l •<-• a !/) to u E O t-l
o C3 •H «5 •w CJ rt C •iH •H u CJ rH rt




rH £ t-t CJ u
o .* u CJ £ c
u t-> > U CJ a
4-> CJ • CJ J«i to Xi
c ^ o 4 u W a c
C- U z; CJ C3 k. 3
(J to
to >- jrf •4-J E
CG W XI
CJ
to <u •*-> C) u •H 3 V4 >. OS
xs Ui •w c CJ t-l Z CJ V4
c "C u u c .c 3 u ^ o CJ3 x V rt ct U <_> CJ r-l tr E XJ













P •^ t/; 9 C *-> p to ro to O CJ c o\ c CJ \ u \ CJ •C \ f— \ <






















S "C 3= <£ •o
o CJ O o cj





















o cj CO CO CO w
to cO tD CO « 4-> 10 w
c •*-> c >- 1! •«-> c; rt ry CJ
co CO cO CO X) 1-4 CO CJ •^ u u
.c +-> •a .c u •-H










o o u, a r» CJ V-i o •a •c +J o m CJ
o u 1-1 cj "w c O CJ CO CJ c CJ c Ul -
tj o tD CJ N ti tD N E K CJ N CJ 3
•H C •H O w c c •<-i CO •H E •<-l E N
U w •H cj Ul *-> r c •r{ w l^ Ih a U Q. •H
o E »-' u o co c rl tB +-> o KA o •m C •H a;£ cO Zl CO f*« *-> •co w 4-> C 3 r~ o x: 3 j^ "' to
4-> lH o > JJ cO to +J CO • »-< o -*-> Ul •*-> cr 4-> cr3 tD u •5 mJ T3 CJ tj • tH c lH D C 3 CJ 3 CJ coG o CO Ul to o CJ ~z a co co (0 co Oj
C u . •*-*
.2 c u r-l rt CO •H c o c o c Ui





c ro OM a u
u u
cj o CO c
C
o
.* V) ,n •rH •H CJ •H
u vt U tf) u Q O U CJ +J
c CJ O •w > Ul U
.J u >- »-l .3 •o c c CJ CO 3
•o 4-> a > c Ul o ^ 5 Ul CO
>- a •ri E CO « CJ • <-< •c 4J CJ
t-t < U 3 Ul •*-• *-> •a Ui to 3
8 a V} t£ CC D. *-> CO c co CJ cr•c Cu c u ^2 rt C co p*^ 10 C •r4
u v< 4-< u eu • t-t to c
•o co u a •H <-r> X3 ^ *-i CJ CO x:
<c u u* c >^ > c >. E CJ CO u *-> u
o 0) cO x: ui o CO CJ O O 3 CJ rt CJ








programs and access to data, provide for recovery from
hardware failure, and allow centralized error checking of
programs and data access are also applicable to the security
of the automated system.
a. Processor Mode, Privileged Instruction Set
Present third generation computer systems have
implemented multiple modes of operations differing in the
ability to process available instructions and in memory
access restrictions. Typically, the system may operate in
one of two modes: the control (executive mode) or the user
mode. The processor will not execute a privileged
instruction unless a processor mode register is set to the
control mode. In the user mode, privileged instructions
cannot te executed and memory accesses are restricted to
those which were assigned while the processor was in the
control mode. In the control mode, all instructions can be
executed and all memory accessed. Should a privileged
instruction occur in a user program or a memory access be
attempted outside the allocated area, an interrupt returns
control to the executive program. User programmed entry
into the control mode is possible only by use of an
executive reguest or monitor call instruction. Programmed
exit to user mode from control mode is accomplished by
executing a return- to- user mode privileged instruction.
[Babcock 67]
b. Core Memory Bounding (BAR, Lock and Key, Paging)
Three major hardware technigues are used to
limit core memory access of user programs to a bounded or
allocated area established by the executive program. The
base address register (BAR) containing upper and lower
limits of allowable core memory access is used to insure
that after indexing or indirect memory addressing, the
hardware memory address is within the bounds of core memory
assigned by the executive program. The lock and key memory
bounds technigue is implemented by the executive assignment
of a key word to user programs and to memory areas that
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defines the authorized core access area for that user
program. The key word is automatically checked in the core
memory before any access is allowed. The third method,
paging, uses the key word designated by the executive as
part of the hardware memory address and access is physically
impossible outside the bounded core memory area. The
techniques vary in terms of hardware cost: The base address
register the lowest; lock and key, intermediate; and paging
the highest.
c. Process Control Register (Read/Write/Execute)
The control of the right to read, write, or
execute data has been implemented utilizing the basic method
used for memory bounding. Flag bits are used in the
associated memory bounds register to indicate the rights of
the user program to read and/or write into core and to
execute program instructions in a given memory area.
d. I/O Control Registers and Mask Register
The loading of I/O control registers and I/O
mask registers allows the centralization of all input/output
to executive control which is essential to the effective
isolation of user programs and data. The mask register
provides an effective means of controlling different types
of interrupts including those associated with inadvertent or
deliberate attempts of user programs to perform unauthorized
actions.
e. Parity
Parity, generated for the transmission of data,
is checked by receiving units. A single parity bit detects
any single or odd number of bit errors in the word
(character or bit group) in which it is included. It is
used in most third generation computers to provide a method
to detect hardware errors in all parts of the computer
system. Detection of a parity error causes an interrupt to
the executive mode. [Molho 70]
f. Security Control Flag Bits
Use of flag bits in programs and data fcr the
US

purpose of indicating security level is a technique which
has been suggested but not implemented in any of the systems
surveyed. The flag bits in each data word would indicate
the security level of the data and the class of user who
could read or write the data word. The flag bits in program
instructions would govern execution of the program. Both
hardware and/or software control has been suggested to
interpret the flag bits. The high cost in additional memory
to store these extra bits has been cited as one of the
reasons why the technique has not been inplemented. Seme of
the more advanced systems have implemented the use of flag
bits with software interpretation at the control word level
rather than the individual word level.
g. Code Redundancy
The use of extra bits to provide code redundancy
to enhance the capability to correct errors or to tetter
identify errors has been suggested but not implemented for
key control instructions. The mode control register and
memory bounds register have been suggested as areas where
code redundancy should be used. [Molho 70]
h. Redundant Key Registers and Logic
The technique of using redundant registers for
mode control and I/O channel control has been suggested but
not implemented. The use of multiple registers that would
cause an errcr interrupt if they did not agree would insure
the proper functioning of these key controls.
2 « W§in Mejnor j Module
The control of access to the main memory module is
necessary for proper security control in an automated
system. All programs and data that will be accessed must
ultimately reside in the main memory. Control of main
memory areas in some systems is accomplished by the CPU, in
others by a combination of CPU and memory circuits. Since
all data and programs are read from the memory, the
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integrity of data in the memory is paramount. Hardware
failures must be detected to prevent the possibility of CPU
execution of changed code with unpredictable results.
a. Parity Logic
The memory unit checks and/or generates parity
bits for storage in order that odd bit failures can be
detected. A parity failure causes an interrupt to the
executive mode in the CPU.
b. Key Word Register
In lock and key memory protect systems, the
memory compares the key flags of the access reguest with
those set by the executive in the key word register. This
prevents unauthorized read/write execute access to memory
for data or programs.
c. Bead Only Memory
Eead only memory is used in some systems for key
control programs to provide protection against unauthorized
change to programs or data. The higher cost of such
memories has limited their use.
d. Dedicated Memory
The use of separate memories for different
classes of users has been suggested to provide security of
classified data. Such a system requires control by an
executive program. The physical separation of data into
separate dedicated memories also requires correlation
software technigues to code data. Plug-in dedicated
memcries for special programs and data such as security
access lists and security monitor programs have been
proposed but not implemented.
e. Memory Block Erase
A special instruction and associated hardware to
clear a specified block of memory has been suggested in
order to clear residue from a task upon completion of that
task. This procedure would insure that classified data is
destroyed before memory is reallocated. This prevents core
dump instructions at the beginning of the new user program
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from outputting the previous user's data.
f. Associative Memory
An associative memory allows the retrieval of
data or programs based upon a code match rather than a
hardware address. It has been suggested as a technigue that
could be used to retrieve data or programs based upon a code
designation of the data or program class. Large associative
memories have not been implemented in systems because of
their high ccst.
g. Memory Partitioning Ports
The use of special dedicated ports or paths into
dedicated blocks of memory has been suggested as a method to
isolate special classes of data. The special ports could
only be accessed by a special set of priveleged
instructions.
3 « IZQ. Control Processor
The input/output control processor (IOCP) provides
the hardware interface with mass memory (disc, drums, tapes,
card reader/punch) and with the systems user (printer,
display, communications lines, etc.). Data is transferred
between these external units through the IOCP to the CFU and
main memory. The IOCP features which are particularly
important to data security are the registers and logic that
route the data between the proper external device and the
proper main memory core block and CPU.
a. I/O Bounds Control
The CPU provides the starting address and either the word
count or ending address for any data transfer between
external devices and main memory. The IOCP, through bounds
control, insures that the data is transferred to the
allocated block of memory. Each address is automatically
checked to insure that it is within the address bounds. Any
address outside the address block causes an error interrupt
to the executive mode.
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b. Unit Address Register
The unit address for outputs of data is
furnished to the IOCP by the CPU. Unit select gates connect
the appropriate unit buffer in the IOCP based upon the
contents of the unit address register. For data input,
demand gueueing is processed by the CPU which furnished the
IOCP with a control word defining the allocated memory block
for the input.
c. IOCP Parity Check
Inter- eguipment address, data transfers and unit
address control word parity checks provide the capability of
detecting single failures and preventing the misrouting of
data.
d. I/O Channel/Number Character Check
Logic has been suggested but not implemented to
provide a means to identify misrouting of data in the IOCP.
Before any data is released to a channel, the channel number
terminal device would be checked by the CPU. A character
count register would be set to allow transmission of a
specified number of characters and decremented to zero as
characters are transmitted. At zero count, the channel
number would again be checked and the character count
register reset. This procedure insures that data is being
input/output on the correct channel and, in case of
malfunction, limits the amount of data released.
e. I/O Security Level Register
This I/O register would check a record control
security code word against a channel security level code.
If the classification level of the control word was higher
than the channel level, an interrupt would be generated.
This channel security level check has been suggested but not
implemented.
f. Channel Number Check Logic
This technigue reguires that the channel control
word from the CPU to the IOCP be transmitted twice and
matched ty dual registers in the IOCP before data is
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transmitted on the channel. A mismatch causes an error
interrupt. The technique has been suggested but not
implemented.
g. I/O Answerback Check
This suggested technigue utilizes hardware which
requires answer back identifying the receiving terminal unit
before allowing any transmission to the terminal unit. The
answer back terminal unit identification is checked for
match against the original contrcl word in the IOCP before
data is transmitted.
h. I/O Memory Eraser
The IOCP provides the capability to clear a
block of memory of residue from a previous use of the space.
A control word from the CPU specifies the main memory block
address. The IOCP then cycles through the block addresses
transmitting all zeros to the block address. At the end of
the block, the IOCP generates an interrupt to the CPU that
identifies the block as being cleared. This technique could
be used in CPU limited systems instead of a software
routine.
i. I/O Code Redundancy
Additional bits over those logically required
could be used for terminal addressing. This would provide
the capability of error detection and error correction.
Additional hardware error detection and correction hardware
would be required.
4 • 2ire ct Access Memory Controller
The majority of the data and programs are stored on
direct access memory (disc, drum, tape) and transferred to
the main memory when required for processing. Physical and
electrical control of access to these devices is necessary
to insure security. Electrical access to the devices is
through their controllers which provide for record address
location and read/write execution on the device.
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a. Read Only Lock
Logic and switches on the controller provide the
capability to allow read only access on specified tracks of
disc and drum. n specified tracks of disc and drum. These
switches are set to read only or read/write at system setup
time. tape drivers can also be set to read only by write
disable switches.
b. Record Address Check
The controller checks for parity of each word as
it is read from the device. A parity error generates an
error interrupt to the IOCP.
c. Check Sura Logic
The controller counts the bits in a given record
and checks this total against a total entered at the
beginning cr end of record. If the total does not agree, an
error interrupt is generated. This technique allows the
detection of unauthorized change to records.
5* S^IB^te and Local User Terminals
The computer system terminals are the means used for
communication between the automated system and the user.
Access to the terminals and user capabilities allowed at the
terminals are the key security control features. The
hardware security techniques identified at the terminals
provide means to limit access and control user capabilities.
a. Cryptographic Devices
Cryptographic devices are used to automatically
encode and decode data on communications channels. The
techniques used in the devices are highly classified and
reguire a special engineering discipline. Therefore, it
becomes a cost-effective decision as to the use of
cryptographic hardware devices. For communication channels,
cryptographic techniques are the only known practical method




b. Hang Up and Dial
This technique provides logic that transmits a
request from the terminal for computer services. The
computer then requests a verification of the request from
the terminal. An identification code is automatically sent
that confirms the terminal request. Separate lines have
been suggested for the transmission of the two
identification requests. In some systems, a telephone
confirmation by computer support personnel is used for the
verification of the on-line terminal request. [Petersen 67]
c. Key Pattern Generators
Several techniques to identify individual users
have been suggested. Identification card readers are used
by a few systems. Voice, fingerprint, and combination lock
code generators have been suggested but not implemented for
the generation of individual key patterns. The key patterns
are transmitted to the computer system where access rights
to data and programs are authorized on the basis of the key
pattern comparison.
6 - General Techniques
Some of the hardware technigues apply to more than
one of the subsystems of the computer. They are described
in this section.
a. Combination Lock or Lock And Key
The physical securing of key parts cf the
computer system by combination lock or lock and key has been
suggested as a method to limit access to critical circuits.
The circuits suggested for this protection are the power
circuit at terminals, read only switches on mass memory
devices, the cabinets that contain the IOCP, CPU, core
memories, and dedicated plug in memories.
b. Dual Hardware Access
This technique would require the simultaneous




c. Data Destruction Techniques
The problem of quickly destroying classified
data in cases of seizure of a computer area or a remote
terminal is a security problem in both automated and manual
systems. The problem is not an easy one since large volumes
of data must be destroyed in a short time. The sequential
writing of a random number stream on to data files does not
prevent residual effects on magnetic storage devices, but
would make data recovery much more difficult. Physical
destruction of devices, depending upon the level of
destruction, could destroy the data involved. The
degaussing of the mass storage devices is a possibility but
could reguire too much time or unreasonable power levels.
It is felt that further study is needed to identify
reasonable and practical methods to provide for protection
from the threat of area seizure.
C. HARDWARE AND SOFTWARE COMPARISONS
Effective on-line control to prevent one user's programs
and data from being accessed or changed by other user's
programs can be achieved by hardware techniques. The use of
a processor mode, priviledged instruction set, and memory
bounds provides . the tools for effective isolation of
programs and data. The effective on-line control of files
or data from unauthorized access can best be achieved by
software techniques. The use of user profile tables
(contains user code identification, program rights and
clearance level) provides an effective means to ccntrol
access tc programs and data. Software programs can also
provide security monitoring and security logging of all
access or changes to data and programs. [Carrol 71]
Either software or hardware techniques can be used for
communications channel coding of data, the clearing of
residue data from main memory blocks, terminal user
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identification, detection of unauthorized change to data on
direct access memory, and proper I/O routing.
Software and hardware techniques both are considered
necessary for recovery from software failures, and if
required, the effective isolation of support user's access
to data and programs. The isolation of support personnel
from access to data and programs is the most difficult
automated security technique to implement. The hardware
techniques required consist of processor mode and privileged
instruction set and could include the use of dedicated
memory. Software techniques for isolation that have been
suggested but not implemented include relocative boctstrap,
redundant coding, module dialogue and program
interpretation.
Figure 6 gives a summary of comparisons between hardware
and software techniques. The table shows the security use,
applicable techniques and remarks on major impact.
D. PROCEDURAL TECHNIQUES
Procedural techniques are required to set up, maintain
and monitor the automated security system. They apply as
well to protecting data in the form of hard copy reports as
they do to protecting it in the form of backup tapes and
disk packs, program listings, program decks, common data
pools, and user ID-lists and passwords. They are needed to
establish the manual as well as the automated methods by
which the four functions of security are accomplished.
These four functions are classifying and declassifying data,
providing the means to safeguard the data, providing for
proper accountability, and allowing the dissemination of the
data on the basis of a need-to-know. [ Wasserman 69]
The security that is obtained in any system utlirrately
rests on the responsibility and trustworthiness of the
individuals who are associated with it. There are,
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the four functional area and apply equally to every aspect
of system activity. The first is to guarantee that the
requirement to set up, maintain and monitor the system is
accomplished only by those designated to perform the
indicated function. The second is the formal establishment
by law of personnel responsibility for the safeguarding and
dissemination of classified data. Each person is
responsible to safeguard classified data or programs made
available tc him for the performance of his official duties
and to limit dissemination of that data to only these with
proper security clearance and need-to-know. These two
principle procedures are implemented formally in all
government and in several commercial systems reviewed.
1 • Classify! ncj and Decla ssi fy_ing Procedures
Procedures are available that allow the assignment
of security classification to designated individuals at the
file and program level. In some systems the user profile
table specifically allows the authority to
classify/declassify given files. In all systems, the
ability to classify/declassify files and programs is only
permitted to the individual of highest level security
authority in the installation, usually the system security
officer.
2 - S af ec[uar_di ng_ Procedures
All systems use secure area protection for central
computer areas and remote classified terminals. Access
lists are maintained to allow entry into these areas. The
establishment of such access lists is the designated
responsibility of the system security officer through formal
submittal to the security authority. In addition, this
officer is charged with the establishment and maintenance of
user/terminal profile tables that provide the authority to
access data and files and the assignment of personal ID
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and/or code words to authorized users. These should
preferably be assigned in a random manner and at random
intervals.
3 • Accountability
Procedures are available to provide periodic review
of access logs, security monitor logs, record counts/check
totals and file logs. Such reviews are the responsibility
of the system security officer or data adminstrator and are
called for at stated periodic times. Document signout
procedures similar to that used in manual systems for
classified data are used for hard copy classified material.
An inventory of all hard-copy classified material back-up
tapes disk, packs, program listings and card-decks is
conducted on a periodic basis.
** • Dissemination
The dissemination of data in automated systems is
based on user/terminal profile tables in some systems and on
the use of access lists in others. The system security
officer is responsible for the preparation and maintenance
of the table and lists. In systems that use passwords or
code words, procedures are established for the dissemination
of the current codes on a periodic basis to those authorized
users. These procedural techniques are applicable to any
system, since they are a common requirement for providing
adequate protection. [ Wasserman 69]
E. MANUAL AND AUTOMATED PROCEDURAL COMPARISONS
A comparison of procedures used in automated systems
versus those that are used in manual systems provides a
method to judge the relative value of automated techniques
that are common to both as well as those which are
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procedural techniques are used to (1) secure access where
classified data is used, (2) to assure proper clearance of
personnel, (3) to classify, access, disseminate, and control
classified data, and (4) to protect classified data during
transmission by cryptographic secure communication lines.
The addition of automated techniques to increase the
reliability of these procedures could be viewed as an
attempt to increase the security of automated systems over
that of manual systems.
Analogous techniques used in the two systems are (1)
data storage procedures, (2) data access procedures, (3)
data access accounting, (4) storage check procedures and,
(5) inventory procedures.
Data access procedures in a manual system are based upon
access lists and personnel identification. In automated
systems, access to data and files is based upon
user/terminal profile tables and the requirement to submit
the proper code word. Other techniques have been suggested
such as fingerprint and voice code pattern generators.
Data access accountability in manual systems is
performed by document sign-out. In automated systems, logs
of file access by user or terminal identification can be
kept automatically. Daily safe checks are used in manual
systems to insure storage integrity. In automated systems,
the access logs and security program reports can be reviewed
as often as desired. Periodic inventory is used in manual
systems to insure documents have not been lost or stolen.
In automated systems the files are reviewed periodically,
check sum totals are used to insure data integrity, and all
security logs are reviewed. The conclusion is that the
automated system with the use of modest security techniques,





It is important to understand what present technology
can and cannot do in protecting classified information in a
resource sharing system. Present technology offers no way
to absolutely protect information or the computer operating
system itself from all security threats posed by the human
beings around it. As a consequence, procedural and
administrative safeguards must be applied in
resource-sharing computer centers to supplement the
protection available in the hardware and software.
Security control in a computer system, especially a
resource sharing one, is a system design problem, and
solutions to it must be based on a systems point of view.
The future of data bank security lies in designing a system
with adeguate protection which is not so complex or
expensive as to discourage its use. In principle, the
numter, type, and depth of security controls in a system
should depend on the sensitivity of the information in the
system, en the class of users being served, on the
geographical distribution of the system, on the nature of
the service that the system provides its users, and on the
operational situation that the system supports.
The system designer must be aware of the totality of
potential leakage points in any system in order to create or
prescribe techniques and procedures to block entry and
exploitation. The security problem of specific computer
systems must be solved on a case-by-case basis employing the
best judgement of a team consisting of system programmers,
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